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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS LEE CURTIS, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, DISTRICT COURT 
CASE NO. 226426 
v. 
ruffiMON ELECTRONICS, INC., ) 
and THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE SUPREME COURT 
WESTERN RAILROAD, ) CASE NO. 15018 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
REPLY OF APPELLANT TO 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
CLARIFICATION OF FACTS 
There are several statements of fact related in respon-
dent's brief which examination of the record on appeal will 
disclose to be inaccurate. 
The most significant is a very artful statement appearing 
on page 2 of respondent's brief, "The approaching train rang its 
bell and blew its whistle from a distance in excess of a quarter 
mile from the crossing, and all the way through the crossing." 
There was no testimony at the trial that the train either had or 
rang a bell. The train whistle was heard by Trooper Mattingly 
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when the train was 4/10 of a mile from the crossing, but not 
between that point and the crossing. (Tr. p. 4-A.) The other 
witnesses observed the whistle when the train was within 300 
feet of the crossing. There was no testimony at trial that 
anyone heard the whistle sounded, continuously or otherwise, 
between a point 4/10 of a mile from the crossing and 300 feet 
from the crossing. 
Appellant does not dispute respondent's statement tha: 
the flashing devices at the crossing were operating or that the 
bell installed on the east side of the crossing was ringing as 
the train and pickup involved in the collision approached the 
crossing. The problem is that those devices were not clearly 
visible or audible to approaching eastbound traffic. (Tr. lH 
36.) 
At the time of the accident in which appellant was 
injured, the warning which should have been provided by the whL· 
was virtually the only type of warning which could have prevent: 
the accident, because of the relative speeds involved and the L 
of sight problems presented on the northeast quadrant of the cr: 
sing. (Tr. 41-42, 49.) The driver of the vehicle in whichapr: 
lant was riding as a passenger in fact reacted promptly upon hi' 
first possible visual perception of the approaching train. (lr 
46, 13-A.) 
The gas station owner, Mr. Karras, did not testifY as 
respondent has indicated that he heard the train whistle sounde: 
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"substantially in excess of five seconds." His testimony was 
that he heard the whistle sound for "around five seconds" as 
the train approached the crossing, swung under the truck on 
which he was working, and was under the truck for "one or two 
seconds at the most" before the accident occurred. (Dp. of Allen 
Karras, p. 19.) Finally and most importantly, it should be noted 
that no witnesses have testified that they heard the train whistle 
sounded for the entire one-quarter mile before the train entered 
the crossing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION URGED BY RESPONDENT 
WOULD PRODUCE AN ABSURDITY. 
Respondent argues that the subject statute, §56-1-14, 
U.C.A. (1953), in requiring " ... the sounding of the locomotive 
whistle or siren at least one-fourth of a mile before reaching 
any such grade crossing ... " requires only that the whistle be 
sounded at some point more than one-quarter mile from the cros-
sing. The absurdity of this argument and the result, if that 
were the meaning of the statutory language quoted, is obvious: 
A brief sounding of the whistle one mile, three miles, or five 
miles from the crossing would technically satisfy the statute. 
It is conceivable that a sounding of the whistle once at the 
-3-
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commencement of the trip and never again would likewise satisf; 
the statute, since the whistle would have been sounded "at least. 
one-quarter mile" from every crossing to be encountered during 
the course of the trip. 
The statute provides that the prescribed sounding of 
a whistle or siren shall be "deemed equivalent to ringing the 
bell as aforesaid." Ringing of the bell must be continuous for 
eighty rods (one-quarter mile) before entry upon the crossing. 
The term "as aforesaid" must be considered to incorporate both 
the distance requirement and the term "continuously" or its meat 
ing is lost and the statutory purpose defeated. 
The object of the statute is obviously to provide SO[! 
protection in the form of an audible warning of the train's 
approach to motorists and pedestrians utilizing grade crossings. 
The statute must be construed in such a manner as to promote its 
obvious purpose. The construction urged by respondent would 
produce a contrary result. 
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that 
statutory language must be construed in such a manner as to make 
sense and avoid absurd consequences. 
A statute subject to interpretation is presumed not 
to be intended to produce absurd consequences, but 
to have the most ~easonable applicat~or; its langua~: 
permits If poss~ble doubtful provu~ons should t 
given a'reasonable, r~tional, sensible and intelligen 
construction. 73 Am. Jur. 2d (STATUTES) 265. 
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An illustration of the absurdity that can result from 
literal application of statutory language is cited in 66 A.L.R. 
1228 at 1231: 
An ancient and oft-quoted instance of absurdity 
avoided by construction is the judgment mentioned 
by Puffendorf that the Bolognian law which exacted 
the penalty that "whoever drew blood in the streets 
should be punished with the utmost severity" did not 
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person 
that fell down in the street in a fit. Another is a 
ruling cited by Plowden that the statute of 1 Edward 
II which enacted that a prisoner who broke out of 
prison should be guilty of felony did not extend to 
a prisoner who broke out when the prison was on fire, 
"for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay 
to be burnt." United States v. Kirby, 7 Hall (U.S.) 
482, 19 LEd 278; State v Anderson, 40 NM 173, 56P2d 
1134. 
The two alternative warnings for which provision is 
made in §56-1-14, U.C.A. (1953) both involve the giving of a 
warning for one-quarter mile prior to the train's entry upon a 
crossing. Eighty rods happens to be one-quarter of a mile. The 
first alternative requires continuous warning by the ringing of 
a bell for that distance before the train's passing upon such a 
crossing, and the second provides for an alternative warning 
through the sounding of a whistle or siren. It is obvious that 
the warning contemplated by the statute in either case is for 
the one-quarter mile distance traveled before the train enters 
upon the crossing, as a warning given elsewhere during the train's 
progress would have no effect upon approaching motorists. To say 
that the brief sounding of a whistle at some great distance from 
-5-
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the crossing, at a time the train is not in sight and beyond 
the hearing of motorists approaching the crossing satisfied the 
statute's warning requirement would produce an obvious absurdit) 
contrary to the intent and purpose of the statute. Respondent 
cannot seriously urge that this Court adopt such a construction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that a jury issue was 
and is presented by the evidence herein, that the statutory 
construction urged by respondent should be rejected, and the 
District Court's judgment reversed in order that the issues may 
be submitted to a jury for determination. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 19th day of August, 1977. 
ANTHONY M URBER 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appel 
211 East 300 South, Suite 2ll 
Sa 1 t Lake City, Utah 84lll 
Telephone: 533-0701 
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